## FRANCE AND ALGERIA

- I. De Gaulle's 4 November speech acknowledged growing opposition in France, but clearly warned dissident elements that he would brook no interference in the Algerian
  policy he is pursuing.
  - A. For the first time, he expressed the belief that an Algerian republic will eventually come into existence, and he stressed that he has been working toward an autonomous Algeria.
  - B. He hinted that a unilateral cease-fire declaration by France may be possible.
    - 1. A tacit truce could precede preliminary discussions of the political guarantees the rebels insist on.
    - 2. De Gaulle continues to hold that hostilities must cease before political negotiations can begin.
- II. In France, the immediate reaction to his speech followed expected patterns, from Leftist Deputy Maurice Faure's "pure illusion" re any hope of a solution short of immediate independence, to Georges Bidault's "unacceptable."
- III. In Algeria, the hostility of the majority of the European community was reinforced. Moslems were reluctant to comment, but seemed generally satisfied.

- Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79R00890A001300020007-4 IV. While frustration over the continuing stalemate in Algeria has been mounting at an accelerated rate in France, De Gaulle's stock is still high.
  - A. He could probably win wide acceptance for negotiations with the rebels encompassing more than just cease-fire terms.
  - V. His obsession with national unity has made him hesitate, however, in the face of concerted rightist pressures to keep Algeria French.
    - A. Soustelle is organizing opposition behind a broad economic-political program contrived to catch all shades of anti-regime sentiment.
    - B. The current trial of La Gaillarde (La-guy-yard) and other leaders of the abortive January insur-rection in Algiers is a dangerous focus for right-ist sentiment.
    - C. Extreme rightists would try to seize power if they felt they could get army support.
- VI. French policy hinges on the army.
  - A. Most military men are increasingly inclined to consider Algerian independence inevitable.
  - B. Before the army would consent to quit Algeria, however, it would require at least the appearance of military victory and assurance that the rebels would not be free to take reprisals against Europeans and pro-French Moslems.

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- C. A well organized rightist move would encourage some "activist" officers to try to sway the rest of the army.
- VII. The rebels, who feel international developments are swinging back in their favor, have become increasingly outspoken in rejecting De Gaulle's terms for negotiating a settlement.
  - A. No official reaction to De Gaulle's speech is expected before the Provisional Government's plenary session, which begins on 7 November in Tunis.
  - B. They will demand concrete evidence of French good faith before making any move.
- VIII. Khrushchev's de facto recognition of the rebels' Provisional Government, and Soviet and Chinese commitments of assistance have multiplied pressures on France's allies and on Algeria's neighbors.
  - A. Tunisia and Morocco are under heavy pressure from the rebels and the Bloc to permit transit of materiel and possibly personnel.
  - IX. NATO could become involved if De Gaulle invoked the treaty.
    - A. It is not likely that he would do so, however, unless he considered Bloc aid was reaching considerable proportions in material and personnel.

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- X. At the UN, the Afro-Asian bloc wants a resolution calling for a UN-supervised referendum.
- XI. The states of the French Community have a mediation effort under way.
  - A. But French spokesmen have played down the chances

    De Gaulle would accept such mediation.
  - B. The rebels have also tended to disregard Black African overtures.
  - C. Bourguiba has reportedly agreed to urge the rebels to accept the Black Africans' proposals.
    - 1. Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and the UAR have misgivings about Communist influence unless a speedy solution is found.
- XII. In any event, the initiative now seems to be with the rebels, who are taking an uncompromising stand.